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STORYTELLING, NARRATIVE
RATIONALITY, AND LEGAL PERSUASION
J. Christopher Rideout*
"Humans are essentially storytellers."
-Walter Fisher'
"[T]he law always begins in story: usually in the story the client
tells, whether he or she comes in off the street for the first time
or adds in a phone call another piece of information to a narra-
tive with which the lawyer has been long, perhaps too long, fa-
miliar. It ends in story, too, with a decision by a court or jury,
or an agreement between the parties, about what happened and
what it means."
-James Boyd White
2
As James Boyd White pointed out over twenty years ago, sto-
rytelling lies at the heart of what lawyers do. Every legal case
starts with a story-the client's story-and it ends with a legal
decision that, in effect, offers another version of that story, one
cast into a legal framework. In between, in the middle, lies the
story told at trial-or, rather, the stories told at trial, since most
trials contain competing narratives. 3 Much of the work on legal
storytelling has concentrated on this middle-storytelling at the
trial level. Storytelling there, everyone agrees, is persuasive. The
question is, how?
For many, work on this question dates back to Lance Bennett
and Martha Feldman's 1981 treatise Reconstructing Reality in the
*© 2008, J. Christopher Rideout. All rights reserved. Associate Director of Legal
Writing, Seattle University School of Law. The Author thanks Kenneth Chestek and
Kirsten Davis for their comments on a draft of this Article, as well as Brooke Bowman for
her editing assistance. He also thanks the organizers of the Applied Legal Storytelling
Conference, held in London, United Kingdom, July 18-20, 2007: Brian Foley, Steve
Johansen, Robert McPeake, Erika Rackley, and Ruth Anne Robbins.
1 Walter R. Fisher, Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of
Reason, Value, and Action 64 (U. S.C. 1989).
2 James Boyd White, Heracles' Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and the Poetics of the Law
168 (U. Wis. Press 1985).
3 Id. at 174; see also Robert Burns, A Theory of the Trial 164-166 (Princeton U. Press
1999).
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Courtroom: Justice and Judgment in American Culture.4 Note the
subtitle. As Bennett and Feldman explain, in looking for some-
thing broader in American criminal trials, "justice and judgment,"
they reached "an interesting conclusion: the criminal trial is or-
ganized around storytelling. '5 Bennett and Feldman, both social
science researchers, go on to explain how trial lawyers use story-
telling strategies to construct their cases and, more importantly,
how those story structures are not just descriptive but also ana-
lytic, forming an essential part of the basis for making judgments
about the outcome of the trial and thus serving as an important
part of the formal legal process.6
Ten years later, Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie looked
more closely at the process of legal decision-making, primarily
studying juries, and reached essentially the same conclusion: the
"central cognitive process in juror decision-making is story con-
struction."7 Although in the legal academy Pennington and
Hastie's work shifted a large part of the discussion away from
mathematical and probabilistic models of legal decision-making,8
their research offered support for what many trial lawyers had
already long known 9-that lawyers persuade by telling stories.
Since then, a long line of works has followed on the uses of story-
telling for persuasion in law practice. 10
I See generally W. Lance Bennett & Martha S. Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the
Courtroom: Justice and Judgment in American Culture (Rutgers U. Press 1981).
5 Id. at 3.
6 Id. at 18.
7 Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The
Story Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519, 520 (1991).
8 Id. at 519.
9 See e.g. Gerry Spence, Let Me Tell You a Story, 31 Tr. 72 (Feb. 1995).
10 See Ty Alper et al., Stories Told and Untold: Lawyering Theory Analyses of the First
Rodney King Assault Trial, 12 Clin. L. Rev. 1 (2005); Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy
Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Argument to a Jury, 37 N.Y. L. Rev. 64 (1992); Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Telling Stories and Stories about Them, 1 Clin. L. Rev. 9 (1994); Brian J.
Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers on How to Use Fiction Writ-
ing Techniques to Write Persuasive Facts Sections, 32 Rutgers L.J. 459 (2001); Richard
Lempert, Telling Tales in Court: Trial Procedure and the Story Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev.
559 (1991); Steven Lubet, Persuasion at Trial, 21 Am. J. Tr. Advoc. 325 (1997) [hereinafter
Persuasion at Trial]; Steven Lubet, The Trial as a Persuasive Story, 14 Am. J. Tr. Advoc. 77
(1990); Philip N. Meyer, Making the Narrative Move: Observations Based upon Reading
Gerry Spence's Closing Argument in the Estate of Karen Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, Inc., 9
Clin. L. Rev. 929 (2002); Philip N. Meyer, Vignettes from a Narrative Primer, 12 Leg. Writ-
ing 229 (2007) [hereinafter Vignettes]; Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and
Merlin: Telling the Client's Story Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal
Hero's Journey, 29 Seattle U. L. Rev. 767 (2006). A symposium in the mid-1990s was dedi-
cated to storytelling in law practice. See Lawyers as Storytellers and Storytellers as Law-
yers: An Interdisciplinary Symposium Exploring the Uses of Storytelling in the Practice of
[Vol. 14
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I have long been interested in persuasion, and for many years
I have included theories of persuasion in an advanced legal writing
seminar that I teach. I always ask my students the same ques-
tion-"what persuades in the law?"-and after looking at different
theories of persuasion, they then develop their own theory of legal
persuasion. When I first taught the course, I had in mind rhetori-
cal models of persuasion, starting with Aristotle and Cicero and
moving toward more contemporary rhetorical work.11 Very quickly,
however, I had to add narrative models of persuasion, plus a sec-
ond question-"what is it about narratives that makes them per-
suasive in the law?"
This second question has increasingly consumed the majority
of our class time on theories of persuasion, reflecting the growing
influence of theories of narrative on the ways that we think about
legal persuasion. I would respond to my second question above as
follows: 12
(1) Narratives are "innate" ways of understanding and
structuring human experience; this makes them in-
herently persuasive.
(2) Narrative models go beyond models of persuasion
based on formal or informal logic, to encompass "nar-
rative rationality."
(3) Narratives embody several properties that are psycho-
logically persuasive:
(a) Coherence (a formal property);
(b) Correspondence (a formal property);
(c) Fidelity (a substantive property). 13
Law, 18 Vermont L. Rev. 567 (1994).
11 See e.g. Aristotle, On Rhetoric (transl. George A. Kennedy, Oxford U. Press 1991);
George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric (Princeton U. Press 1998); Chaim
Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric (William Klubach trans., U. Notre Dame Press 1982);
Chaim Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tytecha, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumenta-
tion (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., U. Notre Dame Press 1969); Stephen Toul-
min et al., An Introduction to Reasoning (2d ed., MacMillan 1984); Stephen Toulmin, The
Uses of Argument (Cambridge U. Press 1958).
12 In the seminar, I try to let the students pull these ideas out of the course readings,
gently coaxing them toward these ideas.
13 1 see these three concepts as the major sub-categories for the psychologically per-
suasive properties of narrative, and I discuss them-and their sources-in more detail later
in the Article: coherence, infra section I(C); correspondence, infra section I(D); and fidelity,
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In this Article, I intend to discuss briefly each of these persuasive
features of narratives, but I am particularly interested in the psy-
chologically persuasive properties of narratives and their relation-
ship to legal persuasion. Much has been written about the first two
of those properties, coherence and correspondence-formal proper-
ties, as I would call them. But less has been written about the
third, fidelity, which I would call a substantive property.
By "formal," I mean the structural properties of narratives-
the internal characteristics of the structure of a given narrative
and the way in which those structural parts interact to tell a story
persuasively. My use of the term echoes the initial work on narra-
tive done in the early twentieth century by the group known as the
Russian Formalists, who began to establish a formal (i.e., struc-
tural) vocabulary for talking about narratives. 14 Much of the work
on legal narratives, discussed below, focuses on the formal, or
structural, features of those narratives. In contrast, narrative fi-
delity, the third psychological feature of narratives, is in my view
best seen as a substantive feature of narratives. This property per-
suades, not as a matter of the structure of the narrative, but
rather as a matter of its content and the particular substantive
appeal that the content makes. This appeal, however, is not a sim-
ple matter of the narrative's accuracy or realism, but rather is me-
diated through the judgment of the audience, as will be discussed
below.
In making this distinction, between formal and substantive
properties, I am taking a cue from the speech communication theo-
rist Walter Fisher and his work on "narrative rationality."15 Fisher
writes that "[n]o matter how strictly a case is argued-
scientifically, philosophically, or legally-it will always be a story,
an interpretation of some aspect of the world that is historically
and culturally grounded and shaped by human personality."16
Drawing upon Kenneth Burke, Chaim Perelman, and Stephen
Toulmin, 17 Fisher then argues that any rhetorical model of persua-
sion, including legal persuasion, is incomplete without accounting
infra section I(E).
14 See generally Mieke Bal, Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative (U.
Neb. Press 1985); Mieke Bal, Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative (U. To-
ronto Press 1985); L.T. Lemon & L. J. Reis, Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays (U.
Neb. Press 1965); Vladimir Propp, Morphology of the Folktale (Laurence Scott trans., 2d ed.,
U. Tex. Press 1990) (originally published in 1928).
15 See generally Fisher, supra n. 1.
16 Id. at 49.
17 See supra n. 11.
[Vol. 14
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for reason and argumentation as forms of symbolic action (as op-
posed to being only formal models for reasoning) and without ac-
counting for the elements of argumentative discourse that lead to
adherence on the part of the audience. That is, in Fisher's view,
any model of persuasion needs to account for the role of narra-
tives.18 For Fisher, the idea of narrative rationality-and within it,
the elements provided by storytelling-opens up argumentation
and persuasion to this more complete view. 19
Fisher's narrative model ends with fidelity and, in so doing,
brings in the idea of the audience's adherence. 20 Fisher largely re-
lies on Perelman for his discussion of adherence and uses Perel-
man to add this third, "substantive" property of narrative. I find
this property compelling and somewhat overlooked, and so I intend
to explore it more at the end of this Article, with some very brief
application to a recent United States Supreme Court opinion. 21
But first, an overview of the other features of narratives that, in
my mind, can make them legally persuasive.
I. NARRATIVE FEATURES AND LEGAL PERSUASION
A. Narratives Are "Innate" Ways of Understanding and
Structuring Human Experience; This Makes
Them Inherently Persuasive
Legal trials involve the recounting of human events, which
must be understood in a particular way before a judge or jury can
arrive at a decision. One of the struggles of a trial lawyer is to pro-
vide a structure for that understanding that will lead to a favor-
able result. And narratives, as it turns out, offer a compelling
structure, most probably because narratives are a natural mode
for understanding human experience. 22 The psychologist Jerome
Bruner speaks of a human "predisposition to organize experience
into a narrative form."23 For Bruner, this predisposition toward
18 Narratives are, of course, one of the most powerful forms for expressing symbolic
action.
19 See Fisher, supra n. 1, at 47-49, 62-69.
20 See id. at 105-121, 124-138.
21 Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738
(2007).
22 Burns, supra n. 3, at 159; see also Alper et al., supra n. 10.
23 Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning 47 (Harv. U. Press 1990) (quoted in Burns, supra
n. 3, at 159).
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narrative is linguistically or psychologically "innate," as natural to
human comprehension of the world as our visual rendering of
what the eye sees into figure and ground. 24 Robert Burns points to
narrative structure as "an innate schema for the organization and
interpretation of experience."25
Little disagreement exists about the fact that narratives are
fundamental to our understanding of human experience, but some
questions exist about how (which is why I put "innate" in quota-
tion marks). That is, are narrative structures a feature of lan-
guage, or are they psychologically fundamental in some pre-
linguistic way? And are narrative structures congruent with real-
ity, or are they some type of Kantian category, a structure of the
mind that pre-exists and shapes our understanding of experience?
Several commentators have wrestled with these questions, digging
deeper into why narratives are so fundamental.
Amsterdam and Bruner, for example, note that many theories
treat narratives as being "endogenous"-that is, narrative struc-
tures are inherent either in the structure of the mind or in the
structure of language. 26 In contrast, they suggest that narrative
structures might lie outside linguistic or psychological structures,
as ways of sharing culturally-shared human experiences. 27 If nar-
rative structures are the latter, a type of social or cultural con-
struction, they seem almost universal, perhaps as a consequence of
the fact that humans experience social reality temporally25 or of
the fact that the human life cycle itself contains the elements of a
narrative structure-a beginning, middle, and end, to which we
assign meaning.29
Another theorist, Steven Winter, argues for an endogenous
theory of narrative, favoring the view that narratives-or struc-
tures related to narratives-are fundamental mental models.30
Winter notes that these models have been described in various
2 4 Id. at 47.
2 5 Burns, supra n. 3, at 159.
2 6 Anthony Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner, Minding the Law 115-119 (Harv. U. Press
2000).
27 Id. at 117-118.
28Although the precise nature of the temporality can differ; no matter-narrative
structures, of various sorts, can be seen as the human effort to assign meaning to temporal-
ity.
2 9 See Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction (Ox-
ford U. Press 1967).
30 Steven L. Winter, Making the Familiar Conventional Again, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1607,
1630-1632 (2001).
[Vol. 14
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forms-as scripts, for example, or as stock stories-each form in-
fused with social meaning. 31 Borrowing from George Lakoff,32 Win-
ter sees narratives as built on more fundamental mental models,
ones that rely on category structures or "idealized cognitive mod-
els."33 Whether their model could be called endogenous or exoge-
nous, however, narrative theorists agree that narrative forms are
not only immediately recognizable, but that they allow us to assign
meaning to events through "pre-given understandings of common
events and concepts, configured into the particular pattern of
story-meaning." 34 Narratives strike us as natural ways of under-
standing experience.
Dodging the Kantian debate, Burns argues for a congruency
between the structure of narrative and the structure of human
experience.
Investigators in many fields... have concluded that narrative
forms the deep structure of human action. In other words, the
bedrock of human events is not a mere sequence upon which
narrative is imposed but a configured sequence that has a nar-
rative character all the way down. To act at all is to hold an
immediate past in memory, to anticipate a goal, and to organize
means to achieve that goal-analogously, the "beginning, mid-
dle, and end" of a well-constructed story. Both action and story-
telling are intrinsically chronological and logical.35
If actions are understood chronologically, then they will also be
understood logically, but "logical" in a way that lies deeper than
ordinary understandings of that term. And any effort to under-
stand human actions outside the structure of narratives will yield
only "the disjointed parts of some possible narrative. 36
31 More about stock stories later in this Article.
32 In much of his work, Lakoff explores human cognition, viewing it in terms of the
mental structures that underlie what we call "rationality." See George Lakoff, Women, Fire,
and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind (U. Chi. Press 1987).
33 Winter, supra n. 30, at 1629.
34 Id. at 1628-1629.
35 Burns, supra n. 3, at 222 (footnotes omitted); see also David Carr, Time, Narrative,
and History 16-17 (Ind. U. Press 1986) (upon whom Burns relies).
36 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue 215 (U. Notre Dame Press 1984).
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B. Narrative Models Go Beyond Models of Persuasion
Based on Formal or Informal Logic to
Encompass "Narrative Rationality"
Traditional models of legal adjudication, which are based
solely on informal or formal models of logic, are increasingly seen
as incomplete, or inadequate, for fully describing the persuasive-
ness of legal arguments.37 The "deeper" logic of narrative struc-
tures adds to more traditional models for legal argumentation.
Burns, for example, sees narrative as co-equal with logic in the
trial.38 For Burns, persuasion at the level of the trial relies on two
strands-one strand of narrative and one of logical argument-
related to each other like a twisting double helix that forms a law-
yer's theory of the case.3 9 "One strand is dominated by narrative
and the other by informal logical inference or argument. Narrative
is the story of events, actors, backgrounds, actions, and mo-
tives .... Argument is a logical pattern of propositions ... that
must be proven or disproved." 40 Narrative is thus central to the
lawyer's theory of the case-"a simple, plausible, coherent, legally
sufficient narrative that can easily be integrated with a moral
theme"41-and provides the judge or jury with concrete reasons for
deciding one way or another. The other embedded strand, the logi-
cal one, primarily serves the formal function of rendering the ar-
gument "legally reasonable," but in Burns's view does less to move
the decision maker.42
Walter Fisher goes further, offering what he calls "narrative
rationality"43-a broader view of rationality, one that encompasses
all human actions symbolically expressed and that imposes se-
quence and meaning on those actions. 44 In essence, he redefines
rationality. Fisher sees narrative rationality as more comprehen-
sive than traditional forms of rationality and as something that
more fully enables us to interpret and understand human experi-
ence. He spends three chapters of his book outlining the differ-
37 See e.g. Bernard Jackson, Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence 37-60 (Deborah
Charles Publg. 1988).
38 Burns, supra n. 3, at 36-38.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 36 (footnote omitted).
4 1 Id. at 37.
42 Id.
43 Fisher, supra n. 1, at 20.
44 Id. at 27-28, 47-49. Modern law, of course, relies upon both.
[Vol. 14
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ences between narrative rationality and what we ordinarily regard
as "rationality."
Fishei starts with Aristotle, an identifiable historical begin-
ning point both for what we regard as formal structures of logic
("technical logic," in Fisher's term) and for rhetorical structures for
argumentation ("rhetorical logic"). 45 He then traces the historical
development of each logical form, noting their separation into two
forms of rationality even in Aristotle's work. For Aristotle, both
forms could be regarded as forms of argumentation, but in differ-
ent ways. Technical logic, what we would commonly call formal or
symbolic logic, found its full expression in the analytic syllogism
and relies heavily on the form of the proof for the validity of its
conclusions. 46 In its emphasis on the validity of the logical form,
coupled with the truthfulness of its premises, technical logic can
lead to truth claims about the world. Rhetorical logic, on the other
hand, although it also relies on set, formal structures for argu-
ment, leads to conclusions with a different status. Because rhetori-
cal logic builds upon premises that are probable, as opposed to
true, it leads to conclusions that are situational, contextual, and
bound to the beliefs of the audience. 47 The keys to rhetorical logic,
then, are probability and audience. 48 Despite this different status,
however, Aristotle regarded rhetorical logic as an essential part of
civic life and deemed it "practical wisdom."49
Fisher traces these two traditions from Aristotle forward, not-
ing the general privileging of technical logic over rhetorical logic
and the transformation of technical logic into increasingly abstract
forms following its shift toward the methods of empirical science. 50
Technical logic ultimately finds its purest expression in mathe-
matical and symbolic notation. 51 Fisher's point, however, is that
the two logics, taken together, form what are commonly regarded
as "rational" or "logical" ways of understanding the world, and all
valid forms of argumentation and persuasion, including those in
the law, derive from them. 52 Fisher calls this the "rational-world
paradigm."53
45 See id. at 24-49.
4 6 Id. at 28.
4 7 Id.
48 Rather than truth claims.
49 Id.
50 1d. at 30-36.
5 1 1d. at 31.
52 Id. at 44-47; see also Steven J. Burton, An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning
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Fisher does not dismiss the rational-world paradigm, but
views it as incomplete. 54 To it, he would add narrative rationality.
Narrative rationality, derived from the "narrative paradigm,"55 is
broader and accounts more fully for human experience, and thus is
an essential component of communication and persuasion.
The narrative paradigm challenges the notions that human
communication.., must be argumentative in form, that reason
is to be attributed only to discourse marked by clearly identifi-
able modes of inference and implications, and that the norms
for evaluation of rhetorical communication must be rational
standards taken exclusively from informal or formal logic. The
paradigm [Fisher] offer[s] does not disregard the roles of reason
and rationality; it expands their meanings . .56
To the traditional modes and norms for argumentation, then
Fisher adds two more-narrative probability and narrative fidel-
ity 57-to which this Article will return to below.
Others have also challenged the completeness of traditional
argumentative forms, seeing narrative forms as supplying a com-
ponent that is missing from formal models of logic and less evident
in rhetorical models of logic. Bennett and Feldman, for example,
point out the "normative connections" that narrative structures
provide: "Categorizations and logical chains of inference can be
supported by, or even based upon, normative understandings
about excusable and inexcusable behavior in certain circum-
stances."58 Bernard Jackson devotes an entire chapter of his trea-
tise Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence to the question of what he
calls the "normative syllogism," in his view the prevailing model
for legal adjudication.59 Jackson argues that this model, the tradi-
tional basis for the deductive view of the legal process and its ap-
plication of law to fact, barely conceals the narratives upon which
(Aspen Publishers 2007).
53 Fisher, supra n. 1, at 47; see also Delia B. Conti, Student Author, Narrative Theory
and the Law: A Rhetorician's Invitation to the Legal Academy, 39 Duquesne L. Rev. 457, 469
(2001).
54 Richard K. Sherwin offers a similar challenge in law; see What We Talk about When
We Talk about Law, 37 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 9, 13-16 (1992).
55 Fisher, supra n. 1, at 63. Jackson's normative syllogism is central to what Fisher
calls the "rational-world paradigm."
5 6 Id. at 58.
57 Id. at 47-49.
5 8 Bennett & Feldman, supra n. 4, at 57.
59 Jackson, supra n. 37, at 58-60.
[Vol. 14
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it is built.60 Jackson argues that the traditional major premise of
the normative syllogism, the legal rule, is informed by underlying
narrative models that typify human action, although expressed in
the abstract terminology of the law.61 The minor premise, the evi-
dence presented at trial, is built upon the story of the trial.62 The
relationship between these premises, commonly understood as the
application of law to fact, is guided by rules of construal that rely
in turn upon a narrative basis for the underlying premises. 63 In
essence, Jackson rewrites the traditional model for legal adjudica-
tion-the application of law to fact-as a narrative model.
So if narratives are a primary form through which humans
configure ideas and experience, an innate way of human under-
standing, then it follows that narratives can add something to the
more traditionally accepted ways of reasoning about the world,
ways of reasoning through logical or rhetorical forms. The question
becomes, then, what is it that narratives add? As mentioned above,
Fisher responds with two specific principles-narrative probability
and narrative fidelity: "These principles contrast with but do not
contradict the traditional concepts or constituents of rationality.
They are, in fact, subsumed within the narrative paradigm. 64
These principles take us more specifically into the persuasiveness
of narrative structures and thus inform the remaining three per-
suasive features of narratives, all of which I would call psychologi-
cal.
C. Narratives Embody Several Properties That
Are Psychologically Persuasive: Narrative
Coherence (a Formal Property)
The first of Fisher's two features of narrative rationality, nar-
rative probability, embodies what I am calling the formal proper-
ties of narratives. 65 In fact, almost all of the work on the persua-
sive properties of narratives has focused on their formal or struc-
tural features. From the beginning, Bennett and Feldman, for ex-
ample, focused their work on the internal, structural relations
60 Id.
61 Id. at 58-59.
62Id.
63Id.
64 Fisher, supra n. 1, at 66.
6 5 Id. at 47.
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within the stories told in the courtroom.66 These internal relations
were the key to understanding the persuasiveness of a given story.
The fact that these stories are also symbolic representations of
reality makes their internal, structural relations all the more im-
portant.
[T]he way in which a story is told will have considerable bearing
on its perceived credibility regardless of the actual truth status
of the story. This means that the symbols chosen, the structural
elements (scene, act, agent, agency, and purpose) that are de-
fined and left undefined, and the amount of detail provided to
facilitate connections between story symbols, will all have a sig-
nificant bearing on audience judgments about stories. .. 67
In looking at the way that a story is told, most researchers look
primarily to the story's coherence-how well its parts fit together.
Fisher himself uses the term "coherence" almost as a synonym for
"narrative probability" in talking about the features of narra-
tives. 68
Coherence is indeed an essential feature of a persuasive nar-
rative. 69 Faced with competing stories in a trial setting and the
need to decide what "really happened," jurors are influenced by the
story that seems most probable, and the story that is presented
most coherently will also be the story that seems most probable.
70
In my view, narrative coherence can be best understood when it is
further broken down into two parts: internal consistency, how well
the parts of the story fit together, and completeness, how adequate
the sum total of the parts of the story seems.
Internal consistency is important to legal storytelling because
the full story, the "real" story, is seldom told at trial. Rather,
judges and juries construct stories based on the evidence pre-
sented, the fragments of the potential story, perhaps attaching
those fragments to a story framework suggested by a strong open-
ing statement. The work of constructing the story, however, re-
quires inferences, and adjudicators can only make those inferences
in light of an underlying story structure that seems internally con-
66 Bennett & Feldman, supra n. 4.
671 Id. at 89.
68 Fisher, supra n. 1, at 47.
69 Pennington and Hastie tie the coherence of a story to its persuasiveness. Penning-
ton & Hastie, supra n. 7, at 528.
70 See Burns, supra n. 3, at 167.
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sistent. 71 The inferences supply a connection between potentially-
related parts of the story, but only if those parts seem related. If
so, the story seems more likely to be true.72
Researchers like Jackson confine their discussion of internal
consistency to the emerging story framework that underlies the
arguments at trial. "Internal narrative coherence can be conceived
primarily in quasi-logical terms. Are the various parts of the story
consistent with one another, or do they manifest contradiction?" 73
Pennington and Hastie extend the notion of internal consistency
beyond the story framework itself; the framework must also be
consistent with the credible evidence that is being presented and
around which the juror is building the story.74 In any case, consis-
tency-whether among the parts of the story, or between the story
framework and the surrounding evidence-is vital. Legal stories
that lack internal consistency will seem ambiguous-unable to
allow for relationships and connections between their parts-and
worse, will be deemed implausible. 75
The other aspect of a story's coherence is its completeness, the
extent to which the structure of the story contains all of its ex-
pected parts. 76 A story may be internally consistent and yet remain
unconvincing if it is incomplete. According to Bennett and
Feldman, this need for completeness extends to the inferences that
a jury is willing to make.77 They note that a jury, in making infer-
ential steps in the construction of a story, will refer to other cogni-
tive models-narrative scripts-for guidance. 78 If the story struc-
ture at hand is sufficiently incomplete, this process breaks downy 9
Fisher, who calls this "material coherence," makes a similar obser-
vation: "a story may be internally consistent, but important facts
may be omitted, counterarguments ignored, and relevant issues
overlooked."80 The story must account for all of its parts, whether
those parts are explicit or implicit.
71 See Bennett & Feldman, supra n. 4, at 125-141.
72 Lubet, Persuasion at Trial, supra n. 10, at 346-347.
73 Jackson, supra n. 37, at 58.
74 Pennington & Hastie, supra n. 7, at 528.
75 Burns, supra n. 3, at 168.
76 Pennington & Hastie, supra n. 7, at 528.
77 Bennett & Feldman, supra n. 4, at 44-45.
78 Id.
79Id.
80 Fisher, supra n. 1, at 47.
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The coherence of a legal story-its consistency and complete-
ness-greatly influences its persuasiveness. Pennington and
Hastie found that trial stories constructed with attention to fea-
tures of coherence, for example completeness, resulted in more
predictable judgments.81 Looking at the social science research of
both Bennett and Feldman and of Pennington and Hastie, Richard
Lempert was willing to generalize:
I think it is safe to say.., that the more coherent the story a
party presents at trial, the more likely it is that jurors will ac-
cept that party's story independent of the informational content
of the evidence. A trier presented with a jumble of facts is, in
other words, less likely to find for the party presenting those
facts than a trier who receives the same factual information
presented not as a jumble but as a coherent story.8 2
Lempert makes a very strong claim. The structure of the telling
can prevail over the evidence in and of itself. But narrative coher-
ence is only one of two formal or structural properties that render
narratives persuasive, the second being narrative correspondence.
D. Narratives Embody Several Properties That
Are Psychologically Persuasive: Narrative
Correspondence (a Formal Property)
Narrative correspondence is a matter of a story's correspond-
ing to what a judge or jury knows about what typically happens in
the world and not contradicting that knowledge.8 3 This correspon-
dence is an important part of the story's plausibility and hence of
its persuasiveness. Burns calls it "external factual plausibility," a
matter of the story's satisfying the decision maker's sense that it
"could... have happened that way."8 4 Bennett and Feldman add
that the matching can be normative: the actions of a story model
must correspond, not only to a sense of what happens in the world,
but to socially normative versions of what happens in the world.8 5
Jackson agrees:
81 See e.g. Pennington & Hastie, supra n. 7, at 546-549.
82 Lempert, supra n. 10, at 562.
83 Pennington & Hastie, supra n. 7, at 528.
84 Burns, supra n. 3, at 168. Pennington and Hastie also use the term "plausibility."
Pennington & Hastie, supra n. 7, at 528.
85 Bennett & Feldman, supra n. 4, at 57.
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Each narrativised pattern of behavior is accompanied by some
tacit social evaluation: that such behavior is good, bad, pleasing,
unpleasing, etc. Social action is intelligible because we compare
what we see with a stock of socially transmitted narrative mod-
els, each one of them accompanied by a particular social evalua-
tion. The one which most resembles that which we observe ren-
ders our observation not only intelligible in a cognitive sense; it
also provides an evaluation of it.8 6
Although narrative correspondence may sound like a kind of
reality check on the story being constructed at trial, and thus like
a substantive property, it is still a formal feature of narratives.
The correspondence is structural, not referential or "truth-based."
The story at trial must correspond to what "could" happen, or what
"typically" happens, not to what actually happened. What "could"
happen is determined, not by the decision makers' undertaking an
empirical assessment of actual events, but rather by their looking
to a store of background knowledge about these kinds of narra-
tives-to a set of stock stories.8 7 The narrative is plausible, and
persuasive, to the extent that it bears a structural correspondence
to one of these stock scripts or stories, not to the extent that it
"really happened."88
Nevertheless, correspondence relies on relationships with
something outside the trial story itself, which leads Jackson to call
it external narrative coherence.
External narrative coherence involves comparison of the con-
tent of the story told by the witness with other stories which
form the stock of social knowledge of the jury. A story will ap-
pear plausible to the extent that it manifests similarity with
some model of narrative which exists within the stock of social
knowledge of the jury.8 9
Both Jackson and Bennett and Feldman raise the importance of
stored social knowledge, or what this Article earlier referred to as
"narrative scripts," or what are sometimes referred to as "stock
stories."90
86 Jackson, supra n. 37, at 99 (footnote omitted).
87 Bennett & Feldman, supra n. 4, at 50.
88 Alper et al., supra n. 10, at 2-3.
89 Jackson, supra n. 37, at 58-59.
90 See Amsterdam & Bruner, supra n. 26, at 45-47, 117-118, 121-122.
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A story's reference to stock stories bears on its persuasiveness.
To the extent that a story is congruent with them, stock stories not
only lend plausibility to that story, but also offer a frame of refer-
ence for the story's significance. Stock stories not only contain
standard models for human action 91 but also allow generalizations
about the meaning of those actions. In a sense, they are cultural
archetypes, often driven by plot. For example, one stock story,
common to Western culture, is the Conquering Hero-Turned-
Tyrant story.92 A conqueror rescues the polis through valor and
noble deeds and then assumes power. But the conqueror's valor
takes a reversal, through deception and mistaken judgment, or
through corruption, or through character flaw, etc. Now the con-
quering hero becomes a tyrant. The plot can end tragically, with
the destruction of the hero, or it can end redemptively, with self-
realization on the part of the hero, or with the hero's rescue by a
defender, etc. This stock story, recognizable to all of us, can in turn
be mapped onto other narratives, as Amsterdam and Bruner do
with the Supreme Court opinion in Freeman v. Pitts.93 We can un-
derstand the Court's judgment in this opinion, they argue, in
terms of the stock story that lies behind it.
Because stock stories draw upon cultural archetypes, Amster-
dam and Bruner lean toward an exogenous view of narratives-
that the narrative forms we impose on events are culturally
formed, in response to either the aspirations or the plights shared
by human groups. Those narrative forms represent "both the cul-
ture's ordinary legitimacies and possible threats to them."94 And
given that the idea of plight, or threat, or disruption seems com-
mon to stock stories, Amsterdam and Bruner find that they lend
themselves especially well to legal narratives.
In litigation, the plaintiffs lawyer is required to tell a story in
which there has been trouble in the world that has affected the
plaintiff adversely and is attributable to the acts of the defen-
91 See e.g. id. at 45-48, 121-122, 186-187; Foley & Robbins, supra n. 10, at 468-469;
Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 5-16 (1984); Robbins, supra n. 10, at
773-738.
9 2 Amsterdam & Bruner, supra n. 26, at 143-164.
9 3 Amsterdam and Bruner view the Court's opinions as versions of the stock story of
catastrophe narrowly averted. In their retelling of Freeman v. Pitts, Justice Kennedy views
the federal courts, formerly the hero in school desegregation efforts under Brown, as having
turned into an overstepping tyrant that must be withdrawn from the process, which in turn
should be handed back to local government. Id.
94 1d. at 117.
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dant. The defendant must counter with a story in which it is
claimed that nothing wrong happened to the plaintiff (or that
the plaintiffs conception of wrong does not fit the law's defini-
tion), or, if there has been a legally cognizable wrong, then it is
not the defendant's fault. Those are the obligatory plots of the
law's adversarial process. 95
This kind of disruption lends itself to any number of stock stories.
The advocate's task is to successfully match the trial story to the
appropriate stock story.
E. Narratives Embody Several Properties That
Are Psychologically Persuasive: Narrative
Fidelity (a Substantive Property)
So far, this Article has offered an overview of current thinking
about legal narratives and what features of them lend persuasive-
ness to a legal argument. I have put the overview into a schema
that makes sense to me, one that I offer to my students when we
discuss narrative persuasion. In this next section, I want to go be-
yond that familiar schema, using Walter Fisher's concept of narra-
tive rationality as a guide.
The schema so far has focused on formal, or structural, prop-
erties of narrative, as has much of the recent research on legal
narratives and their persuasiveness. But do formal properties
alone make a legal narrative sufficiently persuasive? That is, given
that every trial contains competing narratives, what if those nar-
ratives were equally compelling formally-in terms of their inter-
nal consistency, completeness, and so on. Which, then, would offer
the better argument? At the level of the narrative alone (and set-
ting aside other considerations-the underlying law, the "rhetori-
cal" structure of the legal argument, the quality of the evidence,
etc.), is there something else that a legal audience would find addi-
tionally compelling? Fisher's model indicates that there is.
Alongside "narrative probability," his term for the formal fea-
tures of narratives, Fisher places the second property of "narrative
fidelity." As mentioned above, narrative probability has to do with
whether an audience finds that a story is coherent. Fisher says
that narrative fidelity, on the other hand, has to do with "whether
or not the stories they experience ring true with the stories they
95Id.
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know to be true in their lives. '96 In addition, Fisher contrasts nar-
rative fidelity with the other properties of narrative by noting that
it is a substantive property, not a formal one.97 This intrigues me
and has induced me to explore further narrative fidelity.
At first, it may sound like Fisher is describing narrative fidel-
ity in terms of stock stories-"the stories they know to be true in
their lives"-but I think he is not. The effectiveness of stock sto-
ries, as explained above, is a matter of their formal correspondence
with mental or socially transmitted models. Narrative fidelity is
not a matter of formal correspondence. Rather, narrative fidelity
reaches beyond what is only formal-to, in Fisher's words,
whether the components of a story "represent accurate assertions
about social reality and thereby constitute good reasons for belief
or action."98 Narrative correspondence seems like a process of
structural matching; narrative fidelity seems like a reaching for
something substantive.
Here, Fisher seems to be responding to a question that ini-
tially haunted me: fidelity to what? His answer seems to be "social
reality," although that term may be slippery, and Fisher seems to
know that. He wants to go beyond the formal properties of narra-
tives, properties that make them persuasive, to something more
essential, but he also knows that he must stay away from prob-
lematic concepts like "truth," or even the simple one of "reality."99
The term "social reality" will do for the moment, although he will
tie it to the concept of audience later.
Fisher also seems deliberate in his choice of the word "good,"
as in "good reasons for belief or action." In addition to reaching out
beyond the structural confines of narratives, he is also looking for
a way to add an evaluative or normative component to them. Nar-
ratives can be persuasive because they touch something substan-
tive as well. But having suggested that more traditional forms of
argumentation are incomplete, he has to be careful not to use
terms that would place narrative fidelity back within those tradi-
tions. So the reasons for belief or action cannot be simply "logi-
cal"-that would place narrative fidelity back in the realm of tech-
nical logic-and they cannot be only "probable"-that would place
them in the realm of rhetorical logic. "Good" must suffice, and it
96 Fisher, supra n. 1, at 64.
97 Id. at 75-76.
98 d. at 105.
99 d. at 85-101.
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adds the additional connotative sense of normativity, by connect-
ing values to reason.100
Fisher, then, in describing narrative fidelity as a substantive
property of narratives, must avoid the foundationalist trap of ap-
pealing to something like the truth, and he must elaborate on his
use of an overly vague term like "good." At the same time, he must
try to avoid traditions that otherwise would offer a way of discuss-
ing these matters-for example, philosophy or logic-because he
views those traditions as incomplete. He finds a resolution to all
this in the new rhetoric of Chaim Perelman, 10 1 in whose work
Fisher sees a parallel to his own, and in particular in Perelman's
use of the concept of audience. 10 2
Just as Fisher turned away from formal models for assessing
reasoning, he notes, so did Perelman in developing his new model
of persuasion.10 3 Perelman, who adopted a juridical model for ar-
gumentation, replaced truth with justice as the goal for argu-
ment. 10 4 Perelman then made a second move, regarding the ways
in which argument uses reason to move toward this goal of justice.
Perelman rejected the efficacy of technical models for reasoning,
what we would probably call formal logic, viewing their rules for
validity as overly artificial.10 5
In his new rhetoric, Perelman modified these rules in a way
that allowed for human judgment to enter: the validity of an ar-
gument would be determined, in part, by the judgment of the au-
dience to whom the argument was addressed.106 With this move,
Perelman moved argumentation from the realm of philosophy and
logic back into the realm of rhetoric. Perelman immediately saw
the objection-that this move could render argumentation overly
relativistic or even fallible. He responded by postulating the idea
of the universal audience--'"the best body of critics you can imag-
ine for your subject, given your situation."' 107 For Perelman, the
worth of an argument could be tested by its ability to appeal to
this construct of the universal audience. "An argument is as wor-
100 See Conti, supra n. 53, at 473-474.
1 0 1 See supra n. 11.
102 Fisher, supra n. 1, at 124-126.
10 3 Id. at 124.
104 See id. at 126-130.
105d. at 124.
106 Id. at 132.
107 Id. (quoting Perelman).
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thy as the audience that will adhere to it."108 Now argumentation,
under Perelman's schema, has moved back into the realm of rheto-
ric, but also into a world not only of technical, logical reasoning,
but of values.
Fisher examines Perelman's concept of the universal audience
carefully and regards it as worth adopting for his own concept of
narrative fidelity, with one interpretive modification. Fisher notes
that the universal audience is implied by particular arguments
and that those arguments can be evaluated in part on that ba-
sis.10 9 That is, although Perelman intends the universal audience
to be an abstract concept, useful for testing the worth of an argu-
ment, Fisher believes that the concept can be grounded in specific
situations for specific arguments, as a construct implied by any
given text.' 10
All of this is an elaboration on the idea of "good reasons," the
driving force behind narrative fidelity. Narrative fidelity is a mat-
ter of assessing the substantive worth of a story, but not in terms
of its appeal to abstract universals like the truth, and not in terms
of its ability to translate into formal, logical propositions about
social reality. Rather, whether a story constitutes good reasons for
belief or action is a matter of how willing an audience is to adhere
to the story. That audience is, in a sense, implied by the text of the
story, but because the story itself is situated historically and so-
cially, then in that respect the universal audience-universal in its
willingness to appeal to the highest ideals for justice-is also an
audience of the moment, also situated in an historical and social
setting.
In assessing the concept of narrative fidelity, Fisher notes that
he has introduced it as a way of going beyond logical ways of un-
derstanding argument to a normative understanding of argument.
In his view, argument-"rhetorical communication"-is as laden
with values as it is with reasons, and a fuller view of argument
and persuasion must account for this.1 Looking more specifically
at the law, Amsterdam and Bruner seem to agree. Law is inher-
ently normative-it "prescribe[s] general rules about what is per-
missible and impermissible"' 12-and narrative links this abstract
108 Id. at 138.
109 Id. at 136.
11 0 Id. at 134-138 (footnote omitted).
111 Id. at 105.
112 Amsterdam & Bruner, supra n. 26, at 140.
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normativity of the body of law to the circumstances of our individ-
ual lives.113
[I]t is through narrative that we provide humanly, culturally
comprehensible justifications for our principled decisions and
opinions. It is through narrative, rather than through some im-
peccable, impersonal argument from first precepts, that we
show how or why the plaintiffs or the defendant's case is to be
judged as we judge it.114
And Burns, as well, thinks that part of the value of narrative in
the law is normative or evaluative and that narratives locate the
more abstract normativity of legal rules within the particulars of
individual cases and their settings. "The norms around which sto-
ries are told are not derived from an abstract morality of principle;
they are those actually embedded in the forms of life of the com-
munity in which storyteller and listener find themselves."'1 5
Burns notes that this morality inherent within narrative is in-
tensified in trial contexts, because each of the competing stories is
built around a "theme," forcing the jury to make "comparative
judgment[s] about the relative importance of the norms that the
two positions represent."116 And like Fisher, Burns sees legal nar-
ratives as having this evaluative, or moral, component because
they are tied to action. But in an important step, Burns sees this
connection between the morality of narratives and action as a link
that makes any act of listening to and evaluating narratives an act
of self-definition. "On the other hand, the trial is not simply a fo-
rum for judgments about the morality of individuals and actions.
It is a public forum in which the jury engages in important public
action. Such action reflects and redefines public identity . ,,"7 In
choosing between competing stories, we not only pass judgment on
the competing narratives, but in that act, define ourselves. "In-
deed, the coherence of the self is maintained by our being the sto-
rytellers of our own lives .... 11s This act of self-definition locates
113 Id. at 141.
114 Id.
115 Burns, supra n. 3, at 171.
1 16 Id. at 172.
11 7 Id.
118 Id. at 173.
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us in the public world and fosters the conversation that we call
doing justice. 119
I turn to Burns now because I believe that, in looking at this
evaluative and self-defining function of narratives, he offers an
elaboration on the role of audience in Fisher's concept of narrative
fidelity. For Burns, a trial jury makes its judgment about the com-
peting narratives presented to it based on something more than an
objective, empirical weighing of the presentation of events, or
something that goes beyond the merely inferential:
The juror's judgment is, finally, a practical judgment .... The
jury grasps not the accurate objective characterization of a
situation in theoretical terms but something far more difficult
to describe .... What the juror grasps is a literally indescribable
structure of norms, events, and possibilities for action. 120
Burns later calls this practical judgment "nonformal intelli-
gence," 121 and he cites Justice Holmes in support of it: .'[M]any
honest and sensible judgments ... express an intuition of experi-
ence which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and
tangled impressions-impressions which may lie beneath con-
sciousness without losing their worth."' 122
Burns finds cognates for this practical judgment, or "intuition
of experience," in philosophy, cognates that, in his view, fairly de-
scribe the judgments made regarding legal narratives in trials. In
each of these cognates-from Kant, Aristotle, and Gadamer-
Burns finds a philosophical account of a mode of human under-
standing that "is not reducible to formal inference."1 23 Rather, as
in Fisher's concept of narrative fidelity, these cognates go beyond
formal models of understanding, rely upon a "communal valid-
ity,"1124 and in doing so rely upon shared norms of the commu-
nity.125
In Kant, Burns finds the philosophical cognate of reflective
judgment, a judgment that focuses on particulars rather than on
119 Id. at 162-166, 172-175. Burns sees this conversation as taking place within ten-
sions created by competing narratives.
120 Id. at 199.
121 Id. at 209.
1 22 Id. at 209-210 (quoting Justice Holmes in Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railway.
v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598 (1907)).
12 3 Id. at 211.
1 24 Id. at 217.
125 Id. at 218.
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making inferences from Platonic or abstract universals. 126 Burns
views it as a commonsense kind of judgment that relies on public
perception of what kind of world the community desires. It resem-
bles Fisher's model for a modified universal audience in that it is
situated within particulars and relies on a "community of judg-
ment," rather than generalized, abstract categories of right and
wrong. 127
In Aristotle, Burns finds practical wisdom, phronesis, an ethi-
cal insight that is almost immediate, that works as a kind of ethi-
cal perception, and that relies on tacit knowledge. 128 For Aristotle,
this practical wisdom lies at the heart of moral judgment and re-
sponds to nuance and a sense of the concrete, outstripping abstract
or general theories of what is right.129 In this way, practical wis-
dom relies on a kind of immediate insight, rather than more for-
mal inferential processes. 130
Finally, Burns finds a cognate for practical judgment in
Gadamer's notion of interpretive insight, an "interpretive under-
standing" in which the interpreter moves between hermeneutic
circles-that is, moves between particular detail and more global
structures for understanding, to a "mutual codetermination" be-
tween those particulars and universals that results in a considered
judgment that is separate from technical, or formal, forms of deci-
sion-making. 31 "Interpretive understanding is dependent on our
prejudgments: the web of belief that constitutes our common sense
and defines who we are."132 As with Fisher's universal audience,
these prejudgments are normative and emerge from how we define
ourselves.
So all three of these cognates for practical judgment rely upon
"communal validity," "a validity within the public horizon of the
community with which the judging subject identifies."'133 That is,
126 Id. at 212-213.
127 Id. Burns also looks to Hannah Arendt, who extended Kant's notion of reflective
judgment, originally seen as a kind of artistic judgment, into her own scheme for judgments
about political issues. See Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy 44
(Ronald Beiner ed., U. Chi. Press 1989); The Crisis in Culture: Its Social and Its Political
Significance, in Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought 218 (Penguin
Group 1977); Truth and Politics, in Between Past and Future, supra n. 127, at 241.
128 Burns, supra n. 3, at 213-214.
129 Id. at 213.
13 01d. at 214.
131 Id. at 215-216.
132 Id. at 216.
133Id. at 217.
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all three depend on shared norms, and in that dependence are
rooted in the kind of ideals that characterize Fisher's sense of the
universal audience-ideals that are grounded in historical and
social particulars, rather than in abstract universals. And thus the
judgment available at trial relies upon "the perspectives, norms,
and practices of the community from which judge and jury are
drawn"-but, for Burns, in the best way:
My contention is, of course, that the trial's consciously struc-
tured hybrid of languages is designed precisely to actualize our
reflective judgment, practical wisdom, and interpretive under-
standing in ways that can at least sometimes lift the common
sense of a given community above the least common denomina-
tor of the institutions and practices of that community.134
This statement helps to locate Fisher's use of the universal audi-
ence within the setting of legal narratives. The language of the
trial is interwoven with narrative structures, structures that, by
their very nature, put the legal audience-at trial, the judge or
jury-in a position of exercising practical judgment as well as
technical, logical, inferential judgment. Furthermore, the very act
of exercising that practical judgment is an act of self-definition, an
act that can elevate that audience "above the least common de-
nominator," in the direction of Perelman's best available audi-
ence-assuming that that audience will adhere to the narrative
presented.
Admittedly, the dynamic of narrative fidelity is complicated
and somewhat abstract. Its interest, for me, however, lies in the
following:
* it is substantive;
• it offers a compelling account of how narrative persua-
sion can go beyond formal features alone;
* it reaches beyond "logical," inferential models for ar-
gumentation-something that many of us intuit about
narrative persuasion, but have difficulty accounting
for;
134 Id. at 218.
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it helps to account for normativity in legal arguments
and, in doing so, goes beyond logic alone, to values;1 35
and
* it involves an act of self-definition, not only by the im-
mediate audience, but for the community within which
that audience-and those narratives-are situated.
My remaining task would be, in the brief time left for this pa-
per, to look at narrative fidelity within the context of a specific le-
gal narrative. For that, I turn back to the beginning of this Article,
and to James Boyd White's comment that the law not only begins
with a story but ends with a story, the decision of the judge or
jury-itself a narrative. 136 Quickly, then, I want to look at the end-
ing story, in a Supreme Court decision.
For Supreme Court decisions, the narratives are stories not
only about the case at hand, but also about who we are or wish to
be as a community. In addition, Supreme Court decisions them-
selves offer arguments for their own validity-including an im-
plicit argument based on the underlying narratives. 137 That is, any
Supreme Court decision serves not only as a legal prescription-
the law of the land-but also as part of a larger story about who
we are as a community and what kind of world we want to live
in.138 It not only offers a legal argument to support its holding, but
also locates that argument within an implicit narrative framework
about what kind of people we are and what kind of world we might
inhabit. That implicit narrative framework-about what kind of
people we are-strikes me as a framework that conjures a version
of Fisher's modified universal audience. 39 Whether we would em-
brace the world offered by that implicit narrative framework is a
135 Narrative fidelity may answer part of Richard Lempert's concern, at the end of his
article "Telling Tales in Court," that lawyers may be more persuasive if they pay attention
to how they construct stories, but that in focusing on the structural elements of story con-
struction, they may not necessarily be promoting justice or the "right" result. See Lempert,
supra n. 10, at 573.
136 See White, supra n. 2.
137 See Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983).
138 Cover states that "[n]o set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the
narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for
each decalogue a scripture. Once understood in the context of the narratives that give it
meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we
live. In this normative world, law and narrative are inseparably related." Id. at 4-5.
139 Modified, that is, as Fisher indicates, by grounding that audience in specific situa-
tions for specific arguments. Fisher, supra n. 1, at 134-138.
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matter, in part, of its appeal to something like our practical wis-
dom about it, or our "intuition of experience"-that is, a matter of
its narrative fidelity.
II. JUDICIAL OPINIONS AND NARRATIVE FIDELITY:
PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1140
On June 28, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion
in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dis-
trict No. 1., a case regarding the racial composition of the student
body in public schools. Parents v. Seattle School District is the lat-
est in a series of cases to follow Brown v. Board of Education,141
the landmark case in which the Court ruled that a system of seg-
regated schools could never offer equal educational opportunities
and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The question following Brown was: what form could
school desegregation take?-something that a long line of cases
since Brown has addressed. 142 In response to Brown and its suc-
cessors, school districts across the country have implemented vari-
ous desegregation or voluntary integration policies. 143
The plaintiffs in this most recent case, Parents v. Seattle
School District, challenged the voluntary integration policies in
two school districts, one in Seattle, Washington, and the other in
Louisville, Kentucky. In Seattle, students could apply to attend
any school in the district, but in deciding to which school the stu-
dent was ultimately assigned, the school district used a system of
tiebreakers that included race as a factor. In Louisville, the system
was somewhat different: there, the school district assigned stu-
dents to different schools depending upon the percentages of dif-
ferent races at any given school.
In its plurality opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the
Court found both school plans unconstitutional. The Court ruled
that the plans were not narrowly tailored and failed to meet the
140 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
141 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
142 See e.g. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
143 On the difference between segregation and voluntary integration, see James T.
Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education: A Ciuiil Rights Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy
205 (Oxford U. Press 2001).
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test of addressing a compelling state interest. The opinion of the
Court was divided, however, with one notable concurrence (Justice
Kennedy) that did not join fully with the reasoning of the plural-
ity, and with two sharply-worded dissenting opinions (Justices
Stevens and Breyer) that questioned whether the current opinion
was beginning to reverse the trend that the Court had begun with
Brown.
The opinion in Parents v. Seattle School District promises to
be the topic of a long, heated, and perhaps polarizing debate. 144
How to assess it? In the commentaries to come, many approaches
will no doubt emerge. I would like to look at the opinion from the
perspective of two of its underlying narratives and briefly evaluate
them in terms of their narrative fidelity. Do they offer assertions
about social reality that comprise "good" reasons, or that appeal to
our "intuition of experience"? What is the quality of the audience
that would adhere to, or identify with,145 these narratives-or, put
another way, would these narratives appeal to some version of a
universal audience? And, to the extent that an audience would ad-
here to them, in what ways do they define us, as individuals and
as a community?
The opinion is written in many parts. The plurality opinion is
authored by Chief Justice Roberts, various parts of which are
joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Justice
Thomas filed a concurring opinion, and Justice Kennedy filed an
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice
Stevens filed a dissenting opinion. And Justice Breyer filed a dis-
senting opinion, in which he was joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg. With so many opinions, there are bound to
be a number of underlying narratives. Here, out of a very long
written opinion, are two fragments.
First, from the plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice Rob-
erts:
In Brown v. Board of Education, we held that segregation de-
prived black children of equal educational opportunities regard-
less of whether school facilities and other tangible factors were
equal, because government classification and separation on
144 See e.g. Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5-4, Limit Use of Race for School Integration
Plans: A Bitter Division, 156 N.Y. Times Al (June 29, 2007) (specifically the headline). As of
the initial presentation of this Article, the opinion was only a few weeks old.
145 On his use of Kenneth Burke's concept of identification, see Fisher, supra n. 1, at 66;
see also Conti, supra n. 53, at 469.
HeinOnline  -- 14 Legal Writing: J. Legal Writing Inst. 79 2008
The Journal of the Legal Writing Institute
grounds of race themselves denoted inferiority. It was not the
inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating chil-
dren on the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a con-
stitutional violation in 1954. ("The impact [of segregation] is
greater when it has the sanction of the law"). The next Term,
we accordingly stated that "full compliance" with Brown I re-
quired school districts "to achieve a system of determining ad-
mission to the public schools on a nonracial basis."
The parties and their amici debate which side is more
faithful to the heritage of Brown, but the position of the plain-
tiffs in Brown was spelled out in their brief and could not have
been clearer: "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment prevents states
from according differential treatment to American children on
the basis of their color or race." What do the racial classifica-
tions at issue here do, if not accord differential treatment on the
basis of race? 146
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and
could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The school
districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of
demonstrating that we should allow this once again-even for
very different reasons. For schools that never segregated on the
basis of race, such as Seattle, or that have removed the vestiges
of past segregation, such as Jefferson County, the way "to
achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools
on a nonracial basis" is to stop assigning students on a racial
basis. The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race. 147
And then an excerpt from the dissent written by Justice Breyer:
Finally, what of the hope and promise of Brown? For much of
this Nation's history, the races remained divided. It was not
long ago that people of different races drank from separate
fountains, rode on separate buses, and studied in separate
schools. In this Court's finest hour, Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion challenged this history and helped to change it. For Brown
held out a promise. It was a promise embodied in three
Amendments designed to make citizens of slaves. It was the
promise of true racial equality-not as a matter of fine words on
146 Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2767 (plurality) (brackets and emphasis in original; citations
omitted).
147 Id. at 2768 (citations omitted).
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paper, but as a matter of everyday life in the Nation's cities and
schools. It was about the nature of a democracy that must work
for all Americans. It sought one law, one Nation, one people, not
simply as a matter of legal principle but in terms of how we ac-
tually live.
Not everyone welcomed this Court's decision in Brown.
Three years after that decision was handed down, the Governor
of Arkansas ordered state militia to block the doors of a white
schoolhouse so that black children could not enter. The Presi-
dent of the United States dispatched the 101st Airborne Divi-
sion to Little Rock, Arkansas, and federal troops were needed to
enforce a desegregation decree. Today, almost 50 years later, at-
titudes toward race in this Nation have changed dramatically.
Many parents, white and black alike, want their children to at-
tend schools with children of different races. Indeed, the very
school districts that once spurned integration now strive for it.
The long history of their efforts reveals the complexities and dif-
ficulties they have faced. And in light of those challenges, they
have asked us not to take from their hands the instruments
they have used to rid their schools of racial segregation, in-
struments that they believe are needed to overcome the prob-
lems of cities divided by race and poverty. The plurality would
decline their modest request.
The plurality is wrong to do so. The last half-century has
witnessed great strides toward racial equality, but we have not
yet realized the promise of Brown. To invalidate the plans un-
der review is to threaten the promise of Brown. The plurality's
position, I fear, would break that promise. This is a decision
that the Court and the Nation will come to regret. 148
These are excerpts from two different opinions, offering two differ-
ent stories about Brown and the events that have followed. I chose
these excerpts because of their contrast with each other and the
position in which that contrast puts the reader. It is difficult to
read them without being moved toward a substantive position-
they compel a reading that is, in part, a moral reading.
149
The opinion of Justice Roberts raises a question-what is the
true legacy of Brown?-and then answers that same question by
referring to the opinion of the plaintiffs themselves in that earlier
14
8 Id. at 2836-2837 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
149 Burns, supra n. 3, at 170.
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case: states should not offer differential treatment to schoolchil-
dren on the basis of their race. While affirming this earlier princi-
ple, the opinion then reverses the application of this principle in
the present case: the school districts in both Seattle and Louisville,
by enforcing voluntary integration policies, are now de facto en-
forcing differential treatment on the basis of race. When viewed on
purely logical grounds, the move seems reasonable. 150 If the Court
has earlier affirmed a policy of non-differential treatment on the
basis of race, and if it wants to adhere to that policy, then it should
strike the desegregation plans in both Seattle and Louisville be-
cause they, in turn, enforce differential treatment on the basis of
race. The plurality opinion appears to uphold a legal principle that
was established in Brown and that is grounded in the Fourteenth
Amendment. Brown and its legacy tell an important story, and
this opinion attaches itself to that underlying story, as the latest
chapter in its telling.
The underlying story, of course, is more complex. Brown
struck down policies aimed at deliberately and systematically seg-
regating schoolchildren on the basis of race. It was directed
squarely at policies that discriminated against children of color
and that afforded them inferior educational opportunities. The
policies of the school districts in Seattle and Louisville, on the
other hand, were not intended to discriminate, but rather to inte-
grate-to achieve equal educational opportunities for all school-
children in their districts. Justice Breyer, in his dissent, tells a
different version of the story.
Breyer notes both the history that lies behind Brown and the
continuing need to enforce its promise. He cites the change in the
attitudes toward race in the country, fifty years after Brown, and
the role that Brown played in those changes. "Today, almost 50
years later, attitudes toward race in this Nation have changed
dramatically. Many parents, white and black alike, want their
children to attend schools with children of different races. Indeed,
the very school districts that once spurned integration now strive
for it."151 But, as he notes, the promise of Brown has not yet been
fully realized.
In describing the promise of Brown, Justice Breyer notes the
concreteness of that promise:
150 Or a "cruel irony," as Justice Stevens notes. Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
151 Id. at 2836-2837 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
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It was the promise of true racial equality-not as a matter of
fine words on paper, but as a matter of everyday life in the Na-
tion's cities and schools. It was about the nature of a democracy
that must work for all Americans. It sought one law, one Na-
tion, one people, not simply as a matter of legal principle but in
terms of how we actually live. 152
I am struck by how he frames this promise-"not as a matter of
fine words on paper," not as a "matter of legal principle," but as a
matter of "how we actually live." In making this statement, he
seems to be making a strong appeal in terms of an underlying
story about American democracy-and its history, not only of em-
bracing equality for its citizens, but also of correcting its own mis-
takes from the past. It is a story about the country-almost a
statement of mythos, really-laden with the values of fairness,
promise, and hope. For those whose lives span all or a large por-
tion of American history since Brown and who have seen the
change, that story, for all of its struggles and its incompleteness,
seems right; it appeals to our "intuition of experience" about that
segment of American history and the effort to make its democratic
promise as inclusive as possible. It also seems to be a story that
has defined us, as a country, and that the vast majority of us are
willing to embrace. We are willing to adhere to it and the values
that underlie it.
The excerpt from Justice Roberts, 153 viewed at this level of
"narrative rationality," strikes me as weaker. While it seems more
logical, it does not tell the story with what strike me as "good rea-
sons" or in a way that seems to best define who we are at this mo-
ment. It seems (to borrow Justice Breyer's characterization) more
like "words on paper," or more a matter of abstract legal principle
than of lived experience. It lacks some element that would make
the story compelling. To me, the underlying story of Justice Rob-
erts's opinion is weak on narrative fidelity, weak on its appeal to
my own "intuition of experience" and the way in which that appeal
defines us as a community. I do not think this is where the legacy
of Brown leads, in terms of its story and how that story fits in with
the larger story of American democracy.
On the other hand, my view may not represent a majority
view. It clearly does not represent the majority of the Court. And it
152 Id. at 2836.
153 Admittedly an excerpt, but one that purports to offer a story about Brown.
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may appeal to the "intuition of experience" held by others, if not to
mine. I need to find a way to move away from personal preference
at this point, because Fisher's concept of narrative fidelity relies
upon something larger-his modified sense of the universal audi-
ence. In that vein, it may be helpful to put the appeal (or lack of
appeal) of the plurality opinion in Parents v. Seattle School District
into a larger context. In a work that reexamines Brown and its
legacy, Jack Balkin observes that the underlying principle of con-
stitutional equality affirmed in Brown has subsequently been in-
terpreted in one of two ways: as anticlassification or antisubordi-
nation.154
Anticlassification theorists argue that it is unconstitutional to
classify citizens based on race. When the state does so, it "risks
returning to the racial division of society that characterized Jim
Crow.' 155 Martin Luther King's famous comment in his "I Have a
Dream" speech, that he dreamed of the day when his "four little
children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged
by the color of their skin but by the content of their character," can
be seen as an anticlassification stance. 156 Contemporary anticlassi-
fication theorists argue that even when intended benignly, racial
classifications can be harmful-either by promoting unfairness to
other racial groups, or by stigmatizing the group that is classified.
Seen in this light, Roberts's plurality opinion is more than
merely a logical enunciation of "words on paper" when it indicates
that "[tihe way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race."157 It echoes the words of Jus-
tice Harlan, in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, when he notes
that the "Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor toler-
ates classes among citizens. '158 For Justice Roberts, and for a ma-
jority of the current Court, the legacy of Brown should be a legacy
that extends the anticlassification principle first enunciated in the
154 What Brown v. Board of Education Should Have Said: The Nation's Top Legal Ex-
perts Rewrite America's Landmark Civil Rights Decision 11-14, 55-56 (Jack M. Balkin ed.,
N.Y. U. Press 2001) [hereinafter What Brown Should Have Said].
155 Jack M. Balkin, Brown v. Board of Education. A Critical Introduction, in What
Brown Should Have Said, supra n. 154, at 12.
156 Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, in A Testament of Hope: The Essential
Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr. 219 (James Melvin Washington ed., Harper & Row
1986). King, however, also made comments in the speech that could be seen as antisubordi-
nation comments, and he should not be seen as taking a position one way or the other in a
theoretical debate that postdates him.
157 Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2768 (plurality).
158 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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dissent in Plessy. And for them, anticlassification-to draw on the
language of constitutional theory-relies upon some underlying
narrative that carries with it a sense of "good reasons," ones that
are faithful to their own sense of the story to be told about Ameri-
can democracy.
Those who subscribe to the other theory, antisubordination,
regard constitutional equality as a matter of whether the law is
working to remedy subordination by race-regardless of the form
that the law takes. 159 In their view, the courts, in focusing on ra-
cial classifications alone, might divert attention away from forms
of subordination that result from practices other than racial classi-
fication-or even subtly sanction them. In this theoretical debate, I
am drawn to the antisubordination view, and that may help to ex-
plain my own preference for Breyer's dissenting opinion in Parents
v. Seattle Schools. It rests on an underlying narrative that seems
more faithful to my own experience of who we are as a community.
Balkin places Brown into a grand national narrative that we
tell about ourselves.
Brown fits nicely into a widely held and often repeated story
about America and its Constitution. This story has such deep
resonance in American culture that we may justly regard it as
the country's national narrative. I call this story the Great Pro-
gressive Narrative. The Great Progressive Narrative sees Amer-
ica as continually striving for democratic ideals from its found-
ing and eventually realizing democracy through its historical
development.... The basic ideals of Americans and their Con-
stitution are promises for the future, promises that the country
eventually will live up to, and, in so doing, confirm the country's
deep commitments to liberty and equality. 160
But we do not always adhere to the same narrative version of the
particulars, to the same version of how we can best arrive at our
ideals. Hence the sharp division in the opinions of the Court in
Parents v. Seattle Schools, reflecting differences in how the story is
best told.161 Those differences, under Fisher's narrative paradigm,
are differences in what best reflects our intuition of experience and
in who we want to be as a people. They are differences about the
159 Jack M. Balkin, Brown v. Board of Education: A Critical Introduction, in What
Brown Should Have Said, supra n. 154, at 13.16 0 Id. at 5.
161 See Greenhouse, supra n. 144, at Al.
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story, felt at the deepest levels of what makes us human. We are
still looking for the telling that seems like the right one.
III. CONCLUSION
On the one hand, narrative fidelity seems simple. Does a
story, legal or otherwise, have a tug to it-does it appeal to our
sense of lived experience, and the values that emerge from that
experience? Is that part of what makes it persuasive? On the other
hand, that appeal has to be more than personal preference, and it
has to go beyond mere solipsism. Fisher carefully outlines a
scheme for narrative rationality, as an extension of earlier phi-
losophical and rhetorical traditions, and offers narrative fidelity as
the most complex term of that narrative rationality, because of its
appeal to something more substantive and because it incorporates
values. This appeal intrigues me because versions of it, in one
sense, have been around for a long time-in Aristotle's practical
wisdom, for example, or in Kant's reflective judgment-and yet
theories of argumentation have struggled to place it. Perelman, in
Fisher's view, incorporates it partly into his new rhetoric and the
notion of the universal audience. Fisher places it in narratives.
I mentioned much earlier that one of the primary features of
narratives, for me, is that they are inherently persuasive. The
question for those of us who teach narrative persuasion is, how?
The answer, most commonly, lies in the formal features of narra-
tives, which can be understood, taught, and used.162 Fisher insists
that, as important as these formal features are, there is something
else that reaches beyond the formal features of the story, and be-
yond simple plausibility, to the center of how we allow narratives
to define who we are. I agree. To the extent that our students
think a winning story is one that contains only well-constructed
parts, I believe we should find a way to show them that persuasive
stories should win hearts as well as minds. Narrative fidelity
strikes me as a part of that way.
162 See e.g., the project that is partly described in Meyer, Vignettes, supra n. 10.
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